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Political Connection and Business Transformation in Family Firms: Evidence from China 
 
ABSTRACT: We investigate the impact of family ownership on core business transformation and the 
moderating role of political connections in this relation through a Probit model, conditional Logit model, and 
Heckman selection model with instrumental variable using data from Chinese listed companies covering 2001 
to 2010. The results demonstrate that, compared with non-family firms, family firms are more likely to 
transform their core business, enter strongly correlative industries and non-regulated industries, and adopt a 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) mode. Furthermore, compared with politically non-connected family firms, 
family firms with political connections are more likely to conduct business transformation and adopt M&A 
rather than an internal cultivation mode to realize transformation. In addition, political connections make family 
firms more likely to enter weakly correlative industries and increase their chances of entering 
government-regulated industries. 
Keywords: business transformation; transformation mode; family firm; political connection; ownership 
1. Introduction 
Enterprises are increasingly conducting business transformation actively or passively amid the acceleration 
of economic globalization, the discontinuous progress of technology, the relaxation of government regulations, 
and ever-changing consumer preferences (Zook & Allen, 2010; Aspara et al., 2013). In North America, Zook 
and Allen (2010) found that nearly 20% of the continuously growing companies had experienced at least one 
fundamental change to their core business. In China, more than 46% of listed companies completed business 
transformation from 2001 to 2011. Unlike a diversification strategy, which is just an enterprise’s expansion of 
business scope (Nayyar, 1992), business transformation is about making fundamental changes in an enterprise’s 
core business when the organisation's products or services are out of date, funding or income streams are 
changed, new regulations come into force, or market competition becomes more intense (Kotter, 1995; 
Chairman & Bossidy, 2008). Business transformation is the breakthrough point that can allow an enterprise to 
surpass its growth limit and ensure sustained growth capacity (Porter, 1991). 
The two key issues when conducting business transformation are direction and modes of transformation. 
The direction of a firm’s transformation will have either a weak or a strong correlation, depending on whether 
its original business is related to the transformed business (Wang, 2012). For example, IBM’s transformation 
from IT hardware manufacturing to IT software production had strong correlations, while Galanz’s 
transformation from feather down production to microwave oven manufacturing illustrates weak correlation. 
Mode of transformation refers to the means by which the enterprise enters a new industry: this can occur 
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through either internal cultivation or mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In internal cultivation, the enterprise 
fosters a new business from the seed stage to the incubation and growth stages entirely through its own 
resources and capabilities; in M&A, corporations gain ownership of or controlling power over target enterprises 
by merging with or acquiring them. For example, Galanz, the world’s largest producer of microwave ovens, 
transformed its core business from down products to microwave ovens by internal cultivation from 1993 to 
1995; IBM accomplished business transformation through about 30 M&A from 1984 to 2005. 
Given the important impact of a transformation strategy on firm performance, many challenge-seeking 
researchers among both academics and industry practitioners have spent a great deal of effort examining the 
influence factors in transformation strategy choice. The literature has assumed that the decline in industry and 
corporate performance is the main driving factor for firms’ business transformation (Gordon et al., 2000; 
Delmar et al., 2003; Zook & Allen, 2010) and has attempted to reveal the determining factors in transformation 
strategy from the angle of financial condition (Amihud & Lev, 1999; Wang, 2012). However, not all firms are in 
declining industries or fail drastically before engaging in transformation, and many blue-chip companies are 
keen on business transformation as well. In addition, many companies have chosen different modes of business 
transformation despite being in similar financial situations. 
We argue that corporate ownership is an important factor influencing decision making in business 
transformation and that choices of transformation mode differ between family and non-family firms. 
Furthermore, from the institutional angle, political connections also play an important role in business 
transformation and may have a greater impact on family firms than on non-family firms. For example, 
compared with non-family companies, family firms have obvious inheriting characteristics due to the 
particularity of their ownership (Carter & Ram, 2004) and have a strong motivation to create wealth across 
generations and build a legacy (Zahra et al., 2004; Carney, 2005; Habbershon, 2006). Therefore, they may be 
more likely than other types of public companies to conduct business transformation. At the same time, family 
firms may be more likely to enter new industries related to their original businesses because of their aversion to 
risk (Patel & Chrisman, 2014). In addition, Chinese family firms suffered political and social discrimination 
because of China’s socialist ideology (Xu et al., 2013; Su et al., 2013) and therefore find it more difficult to 
enter government-regulated industries than do non-family firms. However, some family firms expand their areas 
of investment by fostering connections with the government. There is much evidence that political 
connectedness can help family firms enter regulated industries (Faccio et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008; Ding et al., 
2014; Xu et al., 2015), as the political connections may help family firms obtain more business transformation 
options. 
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This paper investigates the impact of family ownership on business transformation and the moderating 
role of political connections in such a relation using data from Chinese listed companies. The results contribute 
to the existing literature in two ways. First, most of the literature emphasizes the impact of an enterprise’s 
financial situation on business transformation motivation and modes, whereas this paper highlights the 
relationship between ownership and business transformation. Specifically, we contrast family firms with 
non-family firms and reveal the significant differences between them in their choices of transformation mode. 
Second, the extant literature on the effects of political connections focus on firm performance (Wu et al., 2012; 
Xu et al., 2015; Muttakin et al., 2015), investment behaviour (Xu et al., 2013; Zhou, 2013), market capabilities 
(Jia, 2015), and control structure (Chen et al., 2011). We examine a new and important dependent variable: 
business transformation. The results show that political connections have a significant moderating effect on the 
relationship between family ownership and business transformation. 
2. Development of hypotheses 
Due to their unique inheriting characteristics (Carter & Ram, 2004), family firms have strong strategic 
demands for developing and creating wealth across generations (Habbershon & Pistrui, 2002). Wealth across 
generations is a continuous wealth stream that needs to avoid the influence of market changes and the erosion of 
asset values. Following an entrepreneurship-oriented rather than management-oriented strategy becomes the 
basic condition for family firms’ creation of wealth across generations and realization of intergenerational 
succession (Habbershon & Pistrui, 2002; Riviezzo et al., 2015). Entrepreneurship is not just a phasic strategy in 
the lifecycle of family firms but runs through the whole process of their growth (Ucbasaran et al., 2001). As a 
particular form of continuous entrepreneurship, business transformation plays an important role in family firms’ 
long-term survival and success, especially when their core business is facing adverse market conditions (Plate et 
al., 2010). Therefore, the concept of wealth across generations means that family firms have a stronger 
motivation than do other types of public company to conduct business transformation, as has been demonstrated 
in numerous studies (Zahra, 2003; Carney, 2005; Zahra, 2005; Habbershon, 2006).  
Business transformation is inevitably associated with large capital expenditures and has very high 
requirements for resource reserves and financing capacity from the companies. However, Chinese family firms 
face severe financing constraints because of their non-state status and China’s socialist ideology; thus, their 
investments depend heavily on internally generated funds. China’s family firms emerged at the beginning of the 
economic reform of the 1980s; however, their development was hindered by communist ideology before 1990. 
After Deng Xiaoping’s seminal comment on his tour to South China in 1992, family firms were finally set on 
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the right development track. Despite the speed with which family firms developed after 1978, they not only 
suffered political and social discrimination but also had to deal with an unfavourable economic environment. 
The government still controls most resources, and SOEs still enjoy preferential status in obtaining bank loans 
and other key inputs (Allen et al., 2005; Detomasi, 2008; Li et al., 2008; Jackowicz, 2014). Moreover, most of 
China’s family firms are smaller and younger than are their state-owned counterparts and are thus a higher risk 
in the eyes of financial institutions. The information asymmetry between family entrepreneurs and financial 
institutions makes it difficult for family firms to obtain external financing.  
Political connections have been found to help firms obtain preferential treatment from government-owned 
enterprises such as banks (Faccio et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008). The cultivation of political connections is very 
important for family firms in China. In the nation’s relationship-based economy, building connections with the 
government or even engaging in politics can facilitate family firms’ private communications with the state and 
hence mitigate the severe information asymmetry and social discrimination. Moreover, the state treats 
politically connected firms preferentially in their lending of money (Fan et al., 2006; Faccio, 2006; Wu & 
Cheng, 2011; Houston et al., 2014). Political networks can also facilitate relationship-based contracts. As a 
result, friction in external financing for family firms as well as the premium of external over internal capital 
would be reduced, making family firms’ business transformations less dependent on internally generated funds. 
Following the above arguments, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a. Family firms are more likely than are non-family firms to conduct business transformation. 
Hypothesis 1b. Politically connected family firms are more likely than are politically non-connected family 
firms to conduct business transformation. 
Most private companies in China are in competitive industries and seldom set foot in natural monopoly or 
administrative monopoly industries (Garnaut et al., 2012). Chinese private firms were born in the early stage of 
the transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Due to the lack of accumulated core resources 
such as capital, technology, or management, they usually pursue profit by a simple combination of production 
factors and a low level of technical management under a scenario of labour-intensive and price competition (Li 
et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015). The main characteristic of this business model is low entry barriers, which has 
helped many new private firms enter related industries. However, because too many companies entered the 
market, the competition among them was limited to competition via low prices, which led to a vicious price and 
promotion war (Li et al., 2015). Hence, private firms have a strong incentive to seek out new development 
opportunities by entering a new industry.  
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However, in countries with emerging market economies, and especially in China, some industries face 
regional regulatory, employment, and protectionist policies that block firms’ business transformation (Hu and 
Shi, 2008). Therefore, government administrative licensing is an essential prerequisite of private firms’ entry 
into an industry. Researchers have shown that, compared to family firms, the ownership of non-family firms is 
more diffuse (Jiang & Peng, 2011; Chu, 2011; San Martin-Reyna & Duran-Encalada, 2012; Li et al., 2015), and 
the distribution of their shareholders is wider. Accordingly, non-family firms’ social capital is higher than is that 
in family firms. Firms’ social capital refers to the resources embedded in the social networks that the enterprises 
and their members are involved in; this can be obtained and mobilized purposefully by an enterprise’s internal 
and external social solidarity (Burt, 1992). The greater its corporate social capital, the more investment 
opportunities a firm has (Fukuyama, 1995) and the more likely it is to enter regulated industries (Zhao, 1992). 
Consequently, we assume that non-family firms are more likely than are family firms to enter regulated 
industries. 
A family firm’s political connections will affect its chance of obtaining permission to enter regulated 
industries. The wider the firm’s political network, the greater the political status and social influence of its 
members. The stronger its centrality in its network, the stronger its political influence and the better its chance 
of obtaining permission to enter a regulated industry (Sun et al., 2010; Zhou, 2013). Thus, we can describe the 
influence of a firm’s political resources on its business transformation direction this way: the greater the degree 
of a firm’s political connectedness, the higher the possibility that the firm will enter an industry that requires 
permission from the government. A large number of typical cases also show that politically connected family 
firms are more likely than are politically non-connected ones to enter strictly regulated industries. For example, 
the Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Co., Ltd., one of China’s largest Internet service providers, has a great 
deal of political capital relative to other family Internet companies. Its founder, Mr. Ma, was elected a 
representative at the Guangdong Province People’s Congress and the representative at the twelfth National 
People’s Congress in 2013. In 2014, accordingly, Tencent obtained permission to enter the financial industry, 
which is strictly regulated by the government, and became one of the first three privately owned banks to obtain 
permission from the government and the first Internet company to be awarded a banking license. As the largest 
Internet company and an e-commerce giant in China, Alibaba Group not only outperforms Tencent in terms of 
company size, operating income, and profitability but also set up Alipay Network Technology Co., Ltd., China’s 
largest third-party payment platform and a world leader in the industry. However, Alibaba finally lost to Tencent 
in the banking licence competition. Some economic commentators claimed that a lack of the necessary political 
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background was an important cause of Alibaba’s failure.
1
 Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a. Non-family firms are more likely than are family firms to enter strictly regulated industries. 
Hypothesis 2b. Family firms with political connections are more likely than are family firms without political 
connection to enter strictly regulated industries. 
Much of the empirical research indicates that the relation between the original business and the 
transformed business is significantly positively correlated to the transformation performance of the enterprise 
(Pehrsson, 2006) because the greater the link between the original business and the transformed business, the 
greater is the value of the knowledge and capacity amassed in their original industry and reused in the 
transformed business. Thus, while it is difficult for firms without political connections to obtain permission to 
enter strictly regulated industries, they must risk efficiency loss when entering uncorrelated industries (Almeida 
& Wolfenzon, 2006). From the behavioural agency perspective, compared to other types of public company, the 
family looks to socio-emotional wealth and will thus be risk-averse to business opportunities since they are 
risking their personal wealth, reputation, and recognition (Patel & Chrisman, 2014). Maug (1998), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), and Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue that family business owners are always trying to minimize 
the risk to the company, so that family businesses do not focus on investments with high levels of risk. 
Therefore, from the perspective of risk preference, it can be reasonably assumed that family firms are more 
likely than are non-family firms to enter industries correlated to their original business through an extension of 
their industrial chain, allowing them to fully utilize the technology, experience, and know-how accumulated in 
their original industries. 
By contrast, the establishment of political connections can allow family firms to learn the policy 
orientation and control rules of the government, help them obtain key business information, and provide 
guarantees for the amount, quality, and diversity of the information (Koka & Prescott, 2002). All of these 
information advantages help family firms reduce the uncertainty and risk involved in investments in weakly 
correlated industries. Meanwhile, as mentioned, family firms with political connections are more likely to 
achieve business transformation by entering government-regulated industries, which usually have a weak 
correlation, being uncorrelated to the enterprise’s original core business. Thus, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a. Non-family firms are more likely than are family firms to enter weakly correlated industries to 
achieve business transformation. 
                                                        
1 http://yanglinhua.baijia.baidu.com/article/24043, http://www.guifabu.com/archives/11933?utm_source=tuicool.  
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Hypothesis 3b. Politically connected family firms are more likely than are politically non-connected family 
firms to enter weakly correlated industries to achieve business transformation. 
A business transformation strategy occurs through either internal cultivation or M&A. It takes seven to 
eight years to realize a positive return on investment for new businesses cultivated internally, but new 
businesses established through M&A can earn a profit immediately (Biggadike, 1979). Furthermore, an 
important differentiation between family firms and non-family firms is their effectiveness in absorption. 
Effectiveness in absorbing new resource stocks is encouraged by both patient and survivability capital. Both of 
these resources allow and even encourage long-term, creative strategies (Kang, 2000). During integration, 
family firms are more likely to use both creativity and long-term time horizons to develop the best fit of 
resources than are non-family firms. Therefore, family firms are likely to absorb new resource stocks more 
effectively than are non-family firms due to their higher levels of patient and survivability capital (Sirmon & 
Hitt, 2003). Thus, M&A would be more appealing to family firms than to non-family firms. In addition, 
companies implementing business transformation by M&A must pay not only huge funds for the M&A 
in the short term but also many costs for business and culture integration in the long run. The high requirements 
for resource reserves in M&A often force non-family private firms to give up this transformation model. 
However, for family private firms, family resources can be gathered adequately based on kinship to provide 
various forms of support such as financial, physical, and human capital for enterprise development (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003; Dyer, 2006; Li et al., 2015). Based on the abovementioned analysis, it can be reasonably assumed 
that family firms are more likely than are non-family firms to adopt M&A for business transformation. 
We argue that M&A is even more significant for politically connected family firms than for politically 
non-connected family businesses due to China’s strict M&A regulations. First, political connections can help 
family firms acquire more M&A resources. Because of China’s relatively low marketization levels and 
imperfect system, its M&A market is several regulated; as M&A between corporations are not entirely 
marketization actions, local governments play a critical role in the M&A market (Liu et al., 2013; Su et al., 
2013). Some local governments exert control over M&A between local firms in terms of taxes, employment, 
and political promotion. Given this institutional context, some enterprises wishing to conduct M&A may seek 
rent from government to obtain their support. Enterprises with close connections to local government will 
obtain more M&A opportunities and more support from the government after the M&A. Moreover, local 
governments are likely to lower the industry threshold, provide funds and land, lower the tax rate, or provide 
preferential policies, thus helping enterprises with political connections achieve their business transformation 
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target. Second, enterprises with political connections have a stronger motivation to conduct business 
transformation through M&A. As politically connected firms obtain expansion funds and resources through 
government more easily, they obviously have a stronger motivation to conduct large-scale M&A using the 
advantage that non-politically connected enterprises lack, improving their profitability. Meanwhile, the current 
and former government officials who established a firm’s political connections have a strong motivation to use 
their own political resources to assist in the firm’s business transformation through M&A. They will also try to 
benefit from the new core business as soon as possible and then construct a ‘position moat’ in order to 
strengthen their position and status. Thus, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 4a. Family firms are more likely than are non-family firms to conduct business transformation 
through M&A. 
Hypothesis 4b. Politically connected family firms are more likely than are politically non-connected family 
firms to conduct business transformation through M&A. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Samples and data 
3.1.1. Samples 
Following Wang and Song (2010), we first provide a specific definition of ‘enterprise transformation’ 
according to the industry classification guidance of listed companies formulated by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). If the four-digit industry code of the enterprise’s main business has changed, 
we define the enterprise as a transformation enterprise; when the new main business revenue accounts for more 
than 30% of total revenue, we conclude that the company has completed its transformation.
2
  
Several definitions of ‘family firm’ are current, suggesting the relatively undeveloped state of the research 
on this issue (Xu et al., 2013; Miralles-Marcelo et al., 2014). To Barontini and Caprio (2006), a firm is a family 
firm when the largest shareholder owns at least 10% of the ownership rights and either the family or the largest 
shareholder controls more than 51% of direct voting rights. For Fahlenbrach (2009), a family firm is one where 
the CEO is the founder or co-founder. However, Miralles-Marcelo et al. (2014) did not establish a minimum 
                                                        
2 According to the industry classification guidelines of China’s listed companies released by the CSRC, we selected the 
enterprises whose new main business revenue accounts for more than 30% of the total as a criterion. According to this guideline, if 
a business revenue accounts for more than or equal to 50% of the total, we classified this business into the corresponding industry; 
if no one business has revenue accounting for more than 50% of the total but one business’ revenue is the highest among all the 
rest and accounts for more than 30% of the total, we classified this business into the corresponding industry.  
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threshold for family involvement in ownership, as some researchers have done. Taking into account the 
situation in China and following Miralles-Marcelo et al. (2014), we define a family firm as a company owned 
and controlled by a family. This paper uses the following standards for listed family firms. First, the ultimate 
controller can be traced back to a natural person or a family linked by blood and affinity. Second, the ultimate 
controller is the largest shareholder of the listed company directly or indirectly and has ultimate control. 
Following Claessens (2000), ultimate control is considered to have been obtained if 20% or more of the voting 
rights are held via shares of the listed company directly or indirectly or if a family member was recruited to be 
the chairman or general manager and holds 10% or more shares. If these two conditions are not met, the family 
should be the largest shareholder at a 10% cut-off level, and no second-largest shareholder should hold 10% or 
more of shares. Private enterprises include family firms, but not all private enterprises are family firms. Thus, 
companies controlled by a union or employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) association composed of natural 
persons and management buy-out (MBO) companies are excluded.  
To test the research hypotheses empirically, we selected sample firms from companies listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange covering 2001 to 2010.
3
 After we removed observations with missing 
key explanatory variables, the final family firm sample contained 3,082 observations (including 202 
transformation and 2,880 non-transformation family firms). Meanwhile, to test whether family businesses differ 
significantly from non-family businesses with respect to political connections and transformation strategies 
according to the principle that the firms are similar in size and transformation timing, we collected a non-family 
firm sample consisting of 3,153 observations (including 218 transformation companies and 2,935 
non-transformation ones) as a matched sample. 
Table 1 reports the sample distributions of years, original industries the transition enterprises exited, and 
new industries the transition enterprises entered. The data in part A show that business transformations are 
becoming more common and are increasing yearly for both family and non-family firms. The data in parts B 
and C indicate that most enterprises withdraw from their original industries, which range from declining 
industries to growing industries, and then enter high-profitability industries (such as real estate, new energy, and 
communication devices). This may demonstrate that, with the exception of industry recessions, the 
profit-seeking nature of firms may be the fundamental motive for business transformation. 
3.1.2. Data 
Data on the transformation mode, transformation direction, and start and end time of the transformation 
                                                        
3 We limit our sample to non-state controlled firms to ensure that political connections are sought by the company rather than 
imposed by the government, as in state-owned enterprises. 
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were collected by the authors from the companies’ quarterly and annual reports, provided by the information 
disclosure website Huge Tide Network (www.cninfo.com.cn). The M&A data come from the Chinese Listing 
Companies M&A Database of China Security Market Accounting Research (CSMAR). Detailed background 
information about chairmen and CEOs is retrieved from the WIND financial database, which provides detailed 
biographical information on most chairmen and CEOs. Data on political connections were manually sorted 
according to the information provided in company announcements. Financial data and other control variables 




A: Number of the transition enterprises and the non-transformation enterprises 
 Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Family firms Transition 9 11 11 16 23 24 24 26 29 29 202 
Non-transition 156 242 321 300 302 284 228 330 349 368 2880 
Total 165 253 332 316 325 308 252 356 378 397 3082 
Non-family firms Transition 11 12 10 18 24 23 27 27 34 32 218 
Non-transition 159 239 316 308 304 293 231 344 353 388 2935 
Total 170 251 326 326 328 316 258 371 387 420 3153 
B: Distribution of original industries that transition enterprises exit 























Family firms Number 31 24 22 21 21 19 15 15 9 8 17 202 
Proportion 15.3% 11.9% 10.9% 10.4% 10.4% 9.4% 7.4% 7.4% 4.5% 4.0% 8.4 100% 
Non-family 
firms 
Number 33 23 25 22 24 18 14 17 13 7 22 218 
Proportion 15.1 10.6 11.5 10.1 11.0 8.3 6.4 7.8 6.0 3.2 10.1 100% 
C: Distribution of new industries that transition enterprises entry into 























Family firms Number 29 25 23 21 17 15 14 12 10 9 9 18 202 
Proportion 14.4% 12.4% 11.4% 10.4% 8.4% 7.4% 6.9% 5.9% 5.0% 4.5% 4.5% 8.8% 100% 
Non-family 
firms 
Number 31 26 23 22 19 14 16 13  12 11 8 218 




3.2. Variable definition and measurement 
3.2.1. Political connection 
Political connection is an informal tacit contact relationship between an enterprise and government 
officials or government departments, which is manifested in various ways. To measure it, Faccio (2006) 
examines whether the manager is a government official or member of parliament. Given China’s special 
systemic background, Li et al. (2008) argue that the core channels by which family firms establish political 
relations with the government are members of the National People’s Congress or the CPPCC (known as the 
‘member’s channel’), which has an informal reporting relationship with the government, and former 
government officials with a recessive reporting relationship with the government. Political relationships 
established through a member’s channel are stable, long-term, and authoritative; they can help the enterprise 
access key resources easily and obtain a high level of political influence. Political relationships established by 
other channels are often short-term, unstable, and ill-defined. It is easy for managers with a public political 
identity to participate in the interaction between their enterprise and government, as they belong to a more 
highly embedded degree of political connection. At the same time, although managers have some influence, the 
actual controller of the enterprise is the board chairman or general manager. In this study, a dummy variable is 
used as a measurement of political connection: if the chairman of the board or general manager is a 
representative of the National People’s Congress, a CPPCC member, Chinese communist party member, or a 
former government official or member of the military, the assignment is 1 and 0 otherwise. 
The political connection dummy variable does not reflect the strength of the manager’s political 
connection, which weakens the effectiveness of the empirical conclusions. Therefore, we also used a continuous 
variable, the proportion of the directors with political connections on the board of directors, as a substitution 
variable for political connection (Boubakri et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011). Using these two methods of 
measuring political connection refines the political connection metric to meet the requirements of the empirical 
test and enables the two sets of empirical results to support each other, improving the reliability and robustness 
of the study results. 
3.2.2. Transformation strategy 
Following the definition of ‘business transformation’ outlined above, a dummy variable (taking a value of 
1) is used as a measurement of whether the family firm’s main business changes (0 otherwise). Internal 
cultivation and M&A are the two basic business transformation methods. We used two variables, M&A amount 
(MA) and presence of M&A (MA–DUM), as substitution variables for the M&A mode and employed internal 
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investment (INInvest) as a substitution variable for internal cultivation. Accordingly, the total enterprise 
investment (Invest) is equal to the amount of internal investment and the M&A amount, and the index reflects 
the strength of the enterprise’s transformation motive and the speed of its business transformation. In addition, 
to study the relationship between the two kinds of transformation mode (M&A and internal cultivation), we 
used a dummy variable (MA–INInvest) to measure whether the M&A amount is greater than the internal 
investment. 
We assess the choice of business transformation direction in two ways (Richardson, 2006; Wang, 2012). 
First, we determine whether the transformation is a weak correlation (Weak relation). If the industry the family 
firm entered is upstream or downstream of the original industry or if its new products are similar, then the 
transformation is a strong correlation transformation and is assigned a value of 0; otherwise, the transformation 
is a weak correlation transformation and is assigned a value of 1.
4
 Second, we determine whether the industry 
the company entered is under government control (Regulation). If the enterprise enters into a 
government-regulated industry, it is assigned a value of 0; if the new industry features no administrative 
regulation or licensing, it is assigned a value of 0. Given China’s national conditions and the findings in Hu and 
Shi (2008), we regard China’s utility, pharmaceutical, telecommunication, financial, petroleum, and mining 
industries as regulated industries. 
3.2.3. Control variables 
Business transformation and transformation performance are affected by other factors. Following the 
literature (Amihud & Lev, 1999; Gordon et al., 2000; Wang, 2012; Xu et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2015; 
Miralles-Marcelo et al., 2014), we select three categories of control variable: corporate governance variables, 
financial characteristic variables, and dummy variables (i.e. year of transformation and industry classification). 
The literature indicates that the corporate governance variables influence family firms’ expansion and 
investment and that enterprises that are older, larger, and with greater cash flow are more likely to conduct 
business transformation, and their investment scale is larger. 




                                                        
4 The upstream industry refers to the industry at the beginning of the industrial chain, which provides raw materials, components 
manufacturing, and technology. The downstream industry is the industry at the end of the industrial chain, which processes the raw 
materials and components, manufactures the finished goods, or provides services. According to the industry classification 
guidelines for China’s listed companies released by the CSRC, this paper considers the transformation as a strong correlation 
transformation if the first two industrial codes of the enterprise are the same before and after the transformation; otherwise, it is a 
weak correlation transformation. 
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Table 2  
Summary of variables 
Variable Symbol Definition 
Transition strategy Trans-DUM A dummy variable that equals 1if the main business changes and 0 otherwise. 
MA-DUM A dummy variable that equals 1if the enterprise adopts M&A and 0 otherwise. 
MA Natural logarithm of the total cost of M&A during business transformation. 
INInvest5 Internal investment = (payment of cash for building fixed assets and intangible 
assets - net cash of selling fixed assets and intangible assets - depreciation of the 
same year) / total assets at the end of the year * 100%. 
MA-INInvest A dummy variable that equals 1 if the amount of M&A is greater than that of 
internal investment and 0 otherwise. 
Invest The sum of internal investment and M&A during the enterprise transformation 
Weak relation A dummy variable that equals 1 if it’s weak correlation transformation and 0 if 
it’s strong correlation transformation. 
Regulation A dummy variable that equals 1 if the enterprise enters into the regulated industry 
and 0 otherwise. 
Political connection 
(PC) 
PC1 A dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman of the board or general manager 
is a representative of the National People’s Congress, a CPPCC member, a 
Chinese communist party member, or a former government official or a former 
military membership, and 0 otherwise. 
PC2 The proportion of the directors with political connections in the board of 
directors. 
The family's percentage of Share 
ownership  
Ownership The percentage of the shares held by all family numbers in the capitalization. 
Separation of  ownership from 
and control 
Separation The difference between ownership and control.  
Board independence Independence The percentage of independent directors on the board of directors. 
Whether the founder stays in the 
family firm as CEO, chairman, or 
a director 
Founder A dummy variable that equals 1 if the founder stays in the family firm as the 
CEO or chairman or a director and 0 otherwise. 
Board size Board Total number of board of directors members in the one year before 
transformation. 
Enterprise size Size Napierian logarithm of total assets of the one year before transformation. 
Cash flow CF Proportion of net cash flow in total assets of the one year before transformation. 
Operational risk BETA6 Standard deviation of income for the third year before transformation. 
Enterprise age Age Listed years of enterprise. 
Year of transformation Year Study period is ten years，so there are nine annual dummy variables. 
industry classification Industry Industry before transformation, according to industry classification codes for 
Chinese listed companies (12 industry dummy variables). 
 
3.3. Model 
To examine the impact of family ownership on business transformation, we establish the econometric 
model as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
=Transformation strategy Family Ownership Separation Independence Founder
Board Size CF BETA Age Year Industry
     
       
    
       
  (1) 
To examine the moderating effect of political connection on the relationship between family ownership and 
business transformation, we establish the econometric model as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
=Transformation strategy Family PC Family PC Ownership Separation Independence
Founder Board Size CF BETA Age Year Industry
      
        
      
        
  (2) 
                                                        
5 Some researchers do not deduct depreciation when calculating a firm’s internal investment; we follow this approach. The 




3 3 3 21 1 2 2
1 1 1
BETA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROAt t t t t t
t t t
            
                                           
   . To reflect the fluctuation range of 
company revenues, we set three years as the time interval, and perform a rolling computation of the standard deviation of the 
revenues three years before enterprise transformation. 
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We use the following variables: whether the enterprise implements business transformation (Trans–DUM); 
whether it enters a government-regulated industry (Regulation); whether it enters a weakly related industry 
(Weak relation); whether it implements M&A (MA–DUM) or internal investment (INInvest); whether the 
amount of its M&A is greater than that of its internal investment (MA–INIvest); and its total investment (Invest). 
We use the political connection and other control variables as explanatory variables in the regression. In the 
same model, we use PC1 and PC2 as substitution variables of political connection. Thus, we have 16 regression 
models. When the explained variable is Trans-DUM, the probit estimates with endogenous explanatory 
variables are adopted (Greene, 2011). Given that the choices of transformation strategy are contingent on the 
family firm’s decision to diversify, a conditional logit model is employed (McFadden, 1974) when the explained 
variables are Regulation, Weak relation, MA-DUM, MA-INIvest, or other variables,. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports the variables’ descriptive statistics based on the transforming enterprise sample. The sample 
firms are divided into two groups according to the variables Family and PC1.  
According to the data in part A, when using PC1 to measure political connection, 18.8% of the family 
firms have political connections; using PC2 to measure political connection, 20.2% of the directors of family 
firms have political connections, suggesting that China’s family listed companies are generally keen on being 
associated with the government. In terms of business transformation mode, 62.7% of the family companies used 
M&A, and 60.4% of the firms’ M&A amounts are greater than are those of their internal investment. In terms of 
business transformation direction, 47.4% of the family firms entered an industry unrelated to their original main 
business, and 4.5% entered government-regulated industries. In addition, the standard deviations of the size, age, 
cash flow, and debt ratio variables of the sample enterprises are large, indicating significant differences in the 
transforming enterprises’ internal characteristics. Furthermore, a comparison of family and non-family firms 
shows that the means of PC1 and PC2 in the non-family group are lower than are those in the family group; the 
means of MA-DUM and MA-INInvest in the family group are higher than are those in the non-family group; and 
the means of Weak relation and Regulation in the family group are lower than are those in those in the 
non-family group. According to the data in part B, 73.6% of the politically connected firms used M&A, and 
61.8% of firms’ M&A amounts are higher than are those of their internal investment. In terms of business 
transformation direction, 72.0% of politically connected firms entered weakly corrective industries, and 14.5% 
entered government-regulated industries. Comparing politically connected with non-connected firms, the means 
 16 
of MA-DUM, MA-INInvest, Weak relation, and Regulation in the politically connected group are higher than are 
those in the politically non-connected group.  
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients of the main variables with the transformation family 
firms as samples. According to the correlation coefficients, PC1 and PC2 are all significantly positively 
correlated with MA-DUM, MA, MA-INInvest, Invest, Regulation, and Weak relation, indicating that firms with 
political connections are more likely to adopt M&A than internal cultivation to conduct business transformation, 
enter new industries unrelated to their original businesses, and enter government-regulated industries. In 
addition, the absolute value of the explanatory variables’ correlation coefficient is less than 0.3. Following the 
view in Lind (2006) that the collinear problem does not exist unless the threshold value is over 0.3, we believe 




Descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
 
A: Grouping based on variable Family B: Grouping based on variable PC1 
Family firms (sample size=202) Non-family firms (sample size=218) Politically connected firms (sample size=71) Political non-connected firms (sample size=349) 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Mean Median Std. Deviation Mean Median Std. Deviation Mean Median Std. Deviation 
MA-DUM 0.627 1.000 0.316 0.549 1.000 0.357 0.736 1.000 0.138 0.523 1.000 0.386 
MA 3.404 3.592 2.005 3.512 3.608 2.310 3.596 3.588 2.607 3.318 3.211 2.375 
INInvest 3.522 2.983 1.378 3.478 2.892 1.265 3.551 3.430 2.010 3.314 3.298 2.127 
MA-INInvest 0.604 1.000 0.215 0.511 1.000 0.282 0.618 1.000 0.199 0.502 1.000 0.412 
Invest 3.538 3.224 2.134 3.593 3.298 2.706 4.579 4.216 2.003 3.334 3.180 2.169 
Weak relation 0.474 0.000 0.295 0.607 1.000 0.387 0.720 0.000 0.214 0.517 0.000 0.633 
Regulation 0.045 0.000 0.098 0.068 0.000 0.129 0.145 0.000 0.158 0.021 0.000 0.069 
PC1 0.188 0.000 0.216 0.146 0.000 0.183 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PC2 0.202 0.176 0.157 0.182 0.155 0.149 0.286 0.267 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Separation 4.456 3.232 8.052 8.304 7.516 11.417 4.037 3.581 2.178 7.105 6.660 9.258 
Independence 0.329 0.310 0.065 0.385 0.362 0.159 0.373 0.346 0.170 0.335 0.312 0.156 
Board 5.813 6.000 1.702 6.136 7.000 1.920 6.302 7.000 3.658 5.892 6.000 2.999 
Size 20.691 19.621 1.255 23.990 22.273 1.534 24.127 23.652 2.850 21.803 22.019 2.194 
CF 0.129 0.138 0.210 0.134 0.137 0.167 0.141 0.137 0.198 0.127 0.124 0.150 
BETA 1.122 1.085 0.263 1.189 1.152 0.295 0.897 0.986 0.536 1.196 1.183 1.065 



















The Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables. 
 MA-DUM MA INInvest MA-INInvest Invest Weak relation Regulation family PC1 PC2 Separation Independence Board Size CF BETA 
MA 0.343**                
INInvest -0.276** -0.280**               
MA-INInvest 0.443*** 0.403*** -0.258**              
Invest 0.207*** 0.415*** 0.360** 0.104*             
Weak relation 0.112* 0.059* -0.077* 0.154** 0.011            
Regulation 0.106* 0.071 0.090 0.121* 0.018 0.203**           
Family 0.317** -0.106 0.109 0.289* -0.102 -0.378** -0.365*          
PC1 0.188*** 0.420*** 0.041 0.137** 0.217** 0.249** 0.298*** 0.137*         
PC2 0.205*** 0.429*** 0.043 0.044** 0.235** 0.223** 0.281*** 0.129* 0.406***        
Separation 0.033 0.020* 0.029* 0.136 0.021** 0.015* 0.017 -0.208* -0.056 -0.029       
Independence -0.062* -0.025 0.064** -0.291* -0.145** -0.193** 0.086 -0.011 0.017 0.053* 0.182**      
Board -0.045 -0.031 0.057* -0.144 0.009 -0.022** 0.121* -0.009 0.066 -0.170** 0.197* -0.138**     
Size 0.128* 0.166* 0.127* 0.174* 0.251*** 0.076* 0.029** -0.011 0.240** 0.123* 0.118 0.087* 0.135*    
CF 0.223** 0.268*** 0.177* 0.212** 0.277*** 0.259** 0.013 -0.102 0.163* 0.130 0.032* 0.079 0.029 -0.026**   
BETA 0.189** 0.131* -0.109* 0.187* 0.194** 0.338** -0.008 -0.145* -0.170* -0.203* -0.057 -0.105 -0.080 -0.116* -0.238**  
Age 0.107* 0.072* 0.110 0.051* 0.079* 0.018 0.111* -0.118 0.183* 0.125 0.161 0.020 0.137* 0.290** 0.123* -0.077 
Notes: Statistically significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 percent levels. 
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4.2. Subgroup test 
Table 5 reports the subgroup test results for the decisions for family firm business transformations based 
on political connections. Part A uses PC1 to measure political connection, expressed by 1. A t-test and a 
Wilcoxon test were used to examine whether significant differences exist between the two groups of enterprises 
in terms of M&A, internal investment, total investment, and business transformation direction. The data show 
that, for M&A and total investment, the mean and median of the political connection samples are higher than 
are those of the non-political connection samples, and two kinds of inspection are significant. In terms of 
internal investment, the mean and median of the political connection samples are higher than are those of the 
non-political connection samples, but two kinds of inspection are non-significant. The preliminary result shows 
that family firms with political connections tend to engage in M&A for business transformation and that their 
total investment scale for business transformation is significantly higher than is that of the other family firms. In 
terms of enterprise transformation direction, 33.8% of the politically connected samples entered into a 
government-regulated industry, a proportion significantly higher than for those without political connections. In 
part B, we first divide the second political association variables (PC2) into two groups according to their 
median: a variable greater than the median is assigned 1 and 0 otherwise. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are then 
used for the subgroup test. The results are basically consistent with part A, suggesting that the conclusion 
outlined above is sound. 
 
Table 5  
Subgroup test for business transformation decision making of family firms. 
A: Political associated variable PC1(enterprises with political connections=38; enterprises without political connections=164)     
 MA INInvest Invest Weak relation Regulation 
PC1 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1 4.529 4.296 3.531 3.130  4.627 4.153 0.715 1.000 0.144 1.000 
0 3.143 2.651 3.520 3.112 3.285 3.134 0.419 0.000 0.022 0.000 
t 3.129**  0.982  2.793**  3.472***  3.976***  
Wilcoxon Z  4.073***  0.762  2.582**  3.469***  2.860** 
B: Political associated variable PC2 (enterprises with political connections=36; enterprises without political connections=166) 
 MA INInvest Invest Weak relation Regulation 
PC2 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1 4.352 4.090 3.585 3.115 4.558 4.236 0.729 1.000 0.146 1.000 
0 3.223 3.056 3.218 2.973 3.314 3.121 0.455 0.000 0.018 0.000 
t 2.973**  0.801  2.250**  3.308**  3.372***  
Wilcoxon Z  2.251**  0.915  2.774**  2.994**  3.338*** 
Notes: Statistically significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 percent levels. 
 
4.3. Regression results 
Before the regression analysis, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test was carried out to test the 
multicollinearity of every linear regression model; the results show that all the VIFs are less than 2, indicating 
that there is no collinearity among the independent variables. Then, a Hausman test was applied to check the 
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regression models; the result shows that our panel data reject the hypothesis that the random effect model is 
better. Thus, the fixed effect model was adopted. The regression results are shown in Tables 6 and 7.  
 
Table 6  
Regression results of selection and direction of business transformation on ownership and political connections. 
 Trans-DUM Regulation Weak relation 






























































































































































Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -830.18 -815.66 -839.58 -845.82 -828.04 -822.37 
Observations 6235 6235 420 420 420 420 
Notes: Statistically significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 percent levels; the t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Table 7 
Regression results of mode of business transformation on ownership and political connections. 
 MA-DUM MA INInvest MA-INInvest Invest 






































































































































































































































































Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -536.85 -529.66 -529.93 -525.12 -524.46 -515.37 -547.65 -522.85 -537.08 -530.28 
Observations 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
Notes: Statistically significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 percent levels; the t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Table 6 reports the regression results for ownership, political connections, and choice of business 
transformation direction. The results show that, when the model uses Trans-DUM as the dependent variable, the 
regression coefficient of Family is significantly positive at the 10% level. This means that, for enterprises 
without political connections, family firms are more likely than are non-family ones to transform their core 
business, which supports Hypothesis 1a. Additionally, according to the regression coefficient of Ownership, 
which is significantly positive at the 10% level, the greater the family’s share ownership, the more likely the 
firm is to transform its core business. The regression coefficients of PC (including PC1 and PC2) and 
Family*PC are significantly positive at the 1% or 5% level, indicating that political connections make family 
firms more likely to conduct business transformation, supporting Hypothesis 1b. 
The results in Table 6 also show that, whether the dependent variable is Regulation or Weak relation, the 
regression coefficient of Family is significantly negative at the 10% level. This indicates that, among politically 
non-connected companies, family firms are more likely than are non-family firms to enter strong related 
industries, while non-family firms are more likely than are family firms to enter regulated industries. Hence, 
Hypotheses 2a and 3a are fully supported. Furthermore, the regression coefficient of Family*PC is significantly 
positive at the 5% or 10% level, and its sum with that of Family is also positive, indicating that, compared with 
the politically non-connected family firms, politically connected family firms are more likely to enter 
government-regulated industries and weakly correlated industries. Thus, political connections increase family 
firms’ chances of entering government-regulated industries. These results are consistent with the results of the 
previous subgroup test, which support Hypotheses 2b and 3b. 
Table 7 reports the regression results for ownership, political connections, and choice of business 
transformation mode. When the model uses MA-DUM or MA-INInvest as the dependent variable, the regression 
coefficient of Family is significantly positive at the 10% level; when the model uses MA or Invest as the 
dependent variable, the regression coefficient of Family is negative but not statistically significant. These results 
indicate that, for companies without political connections, family firms are more likely than are non-family ones 
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to employ M&A to implement business transformation. Therefore, Hypothesis 4a is supported. 
As Table 7 also shows, whether the dependent variable is MA-DUM, MA, MA-INInves, or Invest, the 
regression coefficient of Family*PC is significantly positive at the 10% or 5% level, and its sum with that of 
Family is also significantly positive. These results demonstrate that, compared with politically non-connected 
family firms or politically connected non-family ones, politically connected family firms are more likely to 
adopt M&A rather than internal cultivation to implement core business transformation; thus, hypothesis 4b is 
fully supported. 
Prior studies’ explanations of the factors in enterprise transformation strategy are drawn mainly from 
company and environmental characteristics: performance and industrial decline are viewed as the fundamental 
factors driving enterprise transformation. However, these studies ignore the influence of managers, especially 
top managers, on enterprise behaviour. The literature is unable to convincingly explain several real-world 
phenomena, such as why many companies with good performance and growth are also in favour of business 
transformation and why many enterprises with the same operating conditions and industry backgrounds exhibit 
significant differences in their transformation strategies. This paper’s research results show that ownership is 
also an important factor in firms’ business transformation and that political connections have a significant 
moderating effect on the relationship between family ownership and strategy choice for business transformation. 
This not only provides a reasonable explanation for the above problems but also helps us understand the growth 
strategies of family firms in transition economies. 
4.4. Robustness test 
4.4.1. Endogeneity test 
Family firms’ political resources and corporate business transformation may have mutual impacts on each 
other. On the one hand, the political connections of family firms affect the firms’ business transformation 
decisions; on the other hand, for the transforming family firm, the greater the investment, the greater the 
contribution to local GDP growth, employment, and tax revenue and the more political resources they have. The 
endogeneity may lead to a biased conclusion; so, the Heckman correction model with instrumental variable is 
used to correct this selection bias. Using a Heckman first-stage model, we conducted a probit regression 
analysis and calculated the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) by taking all firms, including transformation and 
non-transformation firms, as the sample, and the variable reflecting whether the enterprise conducted a 
transformation as the dependent variable. In the Heckman second-stage model, the regression analysis was 
performed by taking the transformation firms as the sample and the transformation direction and transformation 
model as the dependent variables. The precondition for conducting a Heckman selection model is finding one or 
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more variables that can affect whether the explained variables can be found but have no effect on the observed 
explained variables. Therefore, according to Chen et al. (2010), we select the proportion of the politically 
connected firms among regions and industries in China (VPore1) and consider whether the entrepreneurs are 
non-party personage, intellectual, female, or minority (VPore2) as explanatory variables. Then, using the two 
explanatory variables, we establish a probit model of political connection (PC), and place PC as an instrumental 
variable into the Heckman first-stage model. The selection model is as follows: 
0 1 21 2PC VPore VPore                                     (3) 
The regression result of the probit model is:  
     
-0.087 1.11 1-0.113 2
4.207 3.212 2.365
PC VPore VPore 
 
Using the regression equation above, we figured out PC. Then, we placed PC as an instrumental variable 
into the Heckman first-stage model and calculated the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). Based on this, we plugged 
IMR into the Heckman second-stage model to process a regression analysis. The regression results are shown in 
Table 8. The data shown in brackets are the corresponding Z-value, and Wald chi2=196.50, Pseudo R2 =0.097. 
According to the above model, we determine the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), and then place the IMR into 
econometric models 1 and 2. The regression results are reported in Table 8. The results show that the 
conclusions are consistent with Tables 6 and 7. The research conclusions are thus still robust even after 





Endogeneity test result. 
 Transformation direction Transformation mode 
Regulation Weak 
relation 































































































































                                                        
7 We choose the PC2 as the explanatory variable and carry out an empirical analysis. The result shows that, considering 








































































Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.132 0.108 0.118 0.104 0.105 0.098 0.092 
Observations 420 420 420 420 420 420 420 
Notes: Statistically significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 percent levels; the t-statistics are in parentheses. 
4.4.2. Alternative definition of ‘business transformation’  
In its sampling, this paper uses the proportion of enterprise operation revenue out of total income to judge 
whether the enterprise has completed transformation. Some studies use the proportion of the new business’ 
employees out of the total number of staff as a criterion; when this proportion is more than 40%, we conclude 
that the company has completed its transformation (Wang, 2012). We build our transforming companies sample 
according to this definition and obtain 208 family firms that had completed their business transformation as a 
final sample, including 191 enterprises from the original sample. We further collected 223 transformation 
non-family businesses as a matched sample. We substitute the new enterprise sample data into the econometric 
model to run a regression analysis. The result shows that, though the significance level is slightly changed, the 
main conclusions are still consistent with the results shown in Tables 6 and 7.  
5. Conclusions, implications, and future research 
5.1. Conclusions 
This paper examines whether the nature of ownership affects corporate business transformation and how 
political connection affects the relationship between family ownership nature and business transformation. The 
results demonstrate the following.  
First, there are significant differences between family and non-family firms in likelihood and mode choice 
of business transformation: family firms are more likely than are non-family firms to transform their core 
business, and family firms with political connection are more likely to enter strongly correlated industries and 
non-regulated industries, as well as to use M&A to implement business transformation.  
Second, political connection has an important moderating effect on the relationship between family 
ownership and business transformation: compared with politically non-connected family firms, family firms 
with political connections are more likely to conduct business transformation and adopt M&A rather than 
internal cultivation to realize transformation; furthermore, political connections make family firms more likely 
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to enter new industries weakly related to their original core businesses and to increase their chances of entering 
government-regulated industries.  
Our results not only provide new perspectives on the determinants of the direction and mode of corporate 
business transformation but also reveal the impact of political connections on the business transformation 
strategies of family firms. Research on ways to improve family firms’ business transformation decisions should 
thus take the institutional environment, and especially the political connection, into consideration. 
5.2. Implications 
Several managerial implications follow from these findings.  
Our results indicate that the willingness of family firms to transform their core business is much greater 
than that of non-family firms, especially when they have political connections. In theory, business 
transformation should be a kind of self-adaption behaviour conducted when firms face huge environmental 
changes and aim to realize sustainable growth. Some forced, blind, or even frequent business transformations 
are the expression of a lack of a long-term strategic perspective. Family firms should fully recognize the 
complexity of business transformation and avoid blind business transformations by improving internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. In addition, due to the quick returns, family firms are likely to use M&A rather than 
internal cultivation to conduct business transformation, especially when they have political connections. 
Inadequate internal investment may have negative impacts on its international competitive capacity, which is 
not beneficial for family firms’ long-run development. Thus, family firms should consider the relationship 
between internal cultivation and M&A during business transformation. 
Second, our conclusions show that family firms’ political connections eliminate imperfect market 
mechanisms’ negative effects on firm development and conduce to increased investment opportunities, 
especially in regulated industries. The government should promote political and economic institutional reform 
and perfect China’s market system. Doing so will guarantee that enterprises’ instincts will be carried out on a 
transparent, fair, and open platform, which will reduce family firms’ business transformation costs. Further, 
given the current global economic downturn, only if family firms transform and upgrade (aside from the 
constant expansion of their scale) will the Chinese economy develop in a sustainable and healthy way. The 
production and operations of China’s family firms are currently located at the low end of the value chain. As 
China’s demographic dividend is tapering off and as the RMB has continued to appreciate, family firms are 
encountering severe challenges to their extensive mode of production and management. Permitting private 
capital into some regulated industries, such as infrastructure construction, telecom, or financial sector, may not 
only promote family firms’ business transformation and upgrading but also improve production efficiency in 
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those industries.  
5.3. Limitations and future research 
As with any empirical research, this study has limitations. First, our sample comes from Chinese family 
corporations; small and non-listed family companies, the major component of China’s market, were not taken 
into consideration. Thus, future research should study how political connections impact the transformation of 
small and medium-sized family firms and its economic consequences. Second, we use second-hand data instead 
of primary data to verify our conclusions, which may lead to some subjectivity concerning variable values. For 
example, we measure family corporations’ political connections based on whether the firms’ senior executive is 
a deputy in the NPC, member of the CPPC, a party representative, or a former public official. However, this 
approach covers only those cases in which the family firm has contacted the government or an official implicitly 
or informally, thus revealing only the tip of the iceberg of political connectedness.
8
 Future research should 
describe political connections in a more detailed and realistic way in order to reveal their dynamic features and 
their influence on family firms. Finally, a corporation’s business transformation includes two aspects—entering 
a new industry and exiting the primary core business. This study examined political connections’ influence on 
firms’ choice of entry mode; their influence on the way firms quit their primary core business needs further 
investigation. 
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